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Uftiuersity of Utah 
xcept in the present century, suicide has been viewed 
E throughout Western history as an act having ethical significance, one for which moral blame or praise was a proper response. Response. of course, varied with the times. 
During the Stoic era of Greece and Rome, suicide was praised as the 
morally responsible act of the wise man. During the medieval 
Christian era, it was blamed as the most reprehensible of sins. With 
the influence of Durkheim and Esquirol at the close of the 19th cen-
tury, however, the old ethical view of suicide was replaced by a newer, 
ecientific one. Suicide came to be seen as the result of sociological and 
psychological conditions for which the person could not be held respon-
sible, and for which neither blame nor praise would therefore be ap-
propriate. 
But this view itself is now under scrut.iny, and contemporary 
thinkers are beginning to suggest that ethical considerations do apply 
in at least some cases of suicide. This issue is an attempt to look at the 
ethical foundations of such views. and to examine the way in which 
contemporary ethical theory treats the issue of suicide. 
Contemporary ethical theory divides roughly into two major camps: 
the utilitarians, both classical and contemporary, and the Kantians 
IDd their deontological descendants. the modern Kantians and the 
libertarians. Roughly speaking, the difference between the two major 
groups is this. Utilitarians are consequentialists. who assess the moral 
status of an act by inspecting the outcomes or consequences it would 
have. To decide whether a certain thing would be good to do, you con-
sider what would result if you did it. If it would produce happiness, 
pleasure, or other valued outcomes, not just for oneself but for all 
those affected by your action, and would do so to a greater extent than 
any alternative action open to you, it is the right thing to do. If not, 
You ought not do it, This is just to say that you ought to do that act 
Which, of all the possibilities available, produces (in Bentham's famous 
phrase) "the greatest happiness of the greatest number, " or (in other 
classical formulations) the greatest good, or the greatest balance of 
pleasure over pain, or (as contemporary utilitarians are likely to say) 
the maximal satisfaction of acceptable preferences. On a basic 
Utilitarian view, it is wrong to commit suicide if it will destroy not only 
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that life which is a benefit to oneself, but if it will cause oth"e::',r.'::~i~:: 1 
anguish, sorrow, and other emotional, social, and financial d 
due to deprivation and loss. 
In contrast, nonconsequentialists (and there are many varieties, 
cluding not only Kantians but formalists of various sorts, i', ocludinltl 
Ross, Rawls, and the libertarians) claim that considerations other 
consequences are also relevant, and are, in fact. central in any mr'''11 
choice. One ought to honor contracts and keep promises not 
because the outcomes would be good, but because contracts ought 
be honored and promises kept. Some forms of . 
posit formal moral rules, such as "do not steal." "do not lie." or ' 
not kill. " In Kantian theory, underlying and justifying this set 
moral rules is a moral general principle requiring respect for persons, 
or. in Kant's specific view, respect for the human being's capacity 
rational being to generate moral law. Ethical abuses are, in the e"',111 
kind of affront. They are actions which fail to respect the humanity 
and moral worth of the persons who are their victims. 
Most of us harbor both utilitarian and Kantian sorts of intuitions 
about suicide. On the one hand. deploring suicide, we point to ita 
horrible consequences-not only the loss of a person 's life. but 
anguish, grief. and irrational guilt that suicide breeds for the 
members, friends, or other survivors. On the other hand. 
deploring suicide, we point to the way in which suicide violates one 
our most fundamental moral rules: "Do not kill. " Since suicide is 
killing and killing is wrong, we often claim, suicide is wrong eveQ 
without reference to the consequences it might produce. 
It is usually assumed that both utilitarianism and 
prohibit suicide, except perhaps for utilitarianism in those rare CaB. 
where the suicide of one destructive or burdensome indiVidUal\~:::~:il 
stitute a benefit to others. Kant says explicitly that suicide is 
However, it is less than fully clear that such assumptions are 
and even Kant's own claim that his theory prohibits suicide may 
be correct. Rather, the phenomenon of suicide may seem to ser've"! 
test case par excellence for both kinds of moral theory. 
because of taboos surrounding suicide and because of the 
Durkheim, post·Equirol view that suicide is simply a clinical "",blllll 
very few moral philosophers of either utilitarian or Kantian allegild 
have actually addressed the issue, at least until very recent 
Does either utilitarian or Kantian moral theory, in its classical 
temporary formulations, prohibit suicide? 
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To examine this question, we have asked four distinguished 
philosophers to examine suicide as a test case of the fundamental 
ethical theories to which they subscribe. This is not an invitation sim· 
ply to discuss one isolated applied-ethics issue, but to address a much 
more fundamental issue in ethical theory. There is already a substan· 
tialliterature concerning suicide within the field of applied ethics.(It is 
reviewed exhaustively here in David Mayo's comprehensive survey). 
In most of this literature, attention is directed to such issues as 
whether suicide can be rational, whether it can he morally permissible, 
and whether obligations to society or to other individuals override any 
right one may have to end one's life. These questions are increasingly 
frequently raised as patients'-rights groups point to the possibility of 
self-administered death as an option in painful terminal illness, and as 
it becomes increasingly clear that there is no firm legal precedent on 
the status of suicide. However, there is also a more fundamental way 
to consider the issue of suicide, and it is in this way that suicide can be 
considered a test case for moral theories themselves. This is to realize 
that suicide is not just an act like any other, but that there is 
80mething unique about its role in morality. In the last entry in his 
Notebooks 1914-1916, Ludwig Wittgenstein hints at the fundamental 
nature of the relationship between suicide and morality itself: 
If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed. 
If anything is not allowed, then suicide is not allowed. 
This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the 
elementary sin. 
And when one investigates it, it is like investigating mercury vapour 
in order to comprehend the nature of vapours. 
Or is even suicide in itself neither good nor evil? 
But Wittgenstein does nothing more to art.iculate the nature of this 
relationship, or, indeed, call it into question. 
Equally disturbingly, if we look at the views of the two great 
progenitors of utilitarianism and Kantianism, we discover in both 
cases a kind of discontinuity or gap between views on suicide and 
moral theory itself, when we might expect the relationship to be close. 
ConSider, for instance, the views of John Stuart Mill. Would they per-
IDit (self-respecting) suicide, or not? Nowhere does Mill discuss this 
issue, though it might seem to be the best test of his anti-paternalist 
Views. And one can imagine arguing the case on his behalf either way. 
For instance. given his strong emphasis on autonomy and self-
determination, one can imagine that he would permit suicide in any 
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self-respecting case and would forbid all paternalistic suicide ""'v., .. , 
tion, at least where there are no impairments due to "~;'~~~.~~~:;l~~i! 
very young or very old age, etc. But one might also i 
would argue t hat because suicide, like slavery. does not about 
greater range of freedom, it cannot be allowed. Thus, on the one 
which might permit us to determine the relative importance 
assigns to considerations of self-determination and the achievement 
liberty, Mill himself is silent. Similarly, Kant inveighs against su;lcicla l 
in numerous places in his works, and yet, in the Lectures on Ethics, 
pears to admit as acceptable the suicide of Cato. Furthermore, in 
casuistical questions of the Metaphysics of M orals, he el.,,,,llv' 
recognizes that the moral prohibition of suicide can be challenged in. 
variety of cases. Does Kant' s view of moral integrity permit suicide in 
certain kinds of cases Ifor example, altruism. or to avoid degradatiOJU 
or does it prohibit suicide altogether? Again, commentators 
argued both ways. and Kant himself does lit tle to resolve the issue. 
f the four moral philosophers represented here, none adopts O a straightforwardly utilitarian approach, although J an Nar-veson 's paper, particularly where it inspects the rationalitJ and morality of a personal suicide decision, employs tra-
ditional utilitarian criteria and terminology. Thomas Hill is a Kantiaa. 
a classical one, and provides an answer to the issues Kant failed to ali-
dress. Donald Regan examines the position a utilitarian (even. 
sophisticated . contemporary one) must take, and the posit ion of I 
sophisticated, contemporary Kantian as well. This latter is the Ii .. 
tarian view. also shared by Rolf Sartorius. J ointly, these philosopbln 
show not only the ways in which contemporary moral theory has failll 
to contend with an issue that poses perhaps its most difficult test ~ 
but at the same time point the way for its solution. 
arveson's treatment begins by distinguishing what he t.dif 
N to be two very different issues: whether it is wrong to mit suicide, and whether it is advisable. rational. desirable to do so. The former is to be determined by 
whether there is a good reason, from the point of view of . 
general, for forbidding it. This is based on a contractarian view. 
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latter, discussed in ut.ilit.arian t.erms, is a difficult. quest.ion involving 
life-values. On t he first issue, Narveson point.s out that in many par-
ticular cases, there will be definite obligations to particular persons 
that could be violated by committing suicide-but, of course, there 
may not always be such obligations. Where there are not, it is not 
plaUSible to insist that one has obligations to the community strong 
enough to make suicide immoral. 
Turning to the issue of personal suicide decisions. Narveson holds 
that one can hardly claim that suicide is necessarily imprudent or inad· 
visable. Nevertheless, suicide is probably, in most cases, a mistake, 
and for that reason, Narveson holds, we should be generally disposed 
to prevent suicides when we can. He then returns to the basic question 
of whether people have the right to look at their lives in this way, a 
way which presumes that one can use the results of a long· range, cost· 
benefit analysis to decide whether to commit suicide. Thorough en-
dorsement of this way would amount t.o the view that people "belong 
to themselves." 
He puts the question this way: "Do weown ourselves-that is, is my 
life my own, so that I may do with it as I please?" Some objects which 
we take ourselves to own, he argues, are nevertheless objects we ought 
DOt destroy-major artworks, for example. But our own lives are not 
always of value in the way that great works of art are, and the needs, 
interests, and desires of other persons do not supply an adequate 
reason for our staying alive. Even under a fundamentally contrac-
tanan assumption, Narveson assert.s, we do own ourselves. We are 
thus free to choose to live, or to commit suicide, on the basis of the 
hedonistic judgment-on-balance we make in predicting the future 
COUrses of our lives. 
Narveson recognizes that this conclusion has far· reaching im· 
plications for suicide prevention, If a person judges that, on balance, 
his life will not go well and will mean less pleasure, more pain than he 
chooses to endure, we must be prepared to help him change t his bal-
IDce before we have the right to interfere. His life is his own, to do with 
it as he will. 
H ill's account, in contrast., takes a classical Kantian view. Although the ethical background of this piece is qQite dif· ferent from Narveson's, like Narveson's it focuses primarily on those cases of suicide which do not primarily 
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have t.o do with its effects on other persons. A Kantian moral t.heory, 
Hill claims, provides an objection to suicide, even where it does not af. 
fect persons otber than the agent himself. 
To show this, Hill considers four kinds of cases we intuitively find 
somehow less than ideal: the impulsive suicide, the apathetic suicide, 
the suicide who abases himself, and the suicide who (like Narveson's 
central case) decides to act as the result of a hedonistic calculation. 
Developing an extended account of Kant's principle asserting the in-
trinsic value of life as a rational , autonomous agent, Hill modifies it to 
exclude cases where gross, irremediable pain or suffering render 
rational, autonomous agency impossible or intolerable. Nevertheless. 
he finds that the principle, even as modified, will count suicides of im-
pulse, apathy, self·abasement. and hedonistic calculation less Hum 
ideal. The attitudes expressed by such a suicide can be described &8 
those of t he "consumer, " who looks ahead to count up the pleasures 
and pains he can expect from the purchase of additional life, or the 
" obituarist," who looks backward to assess the overall character of life 
to this point. Both attitudes fail to recognize the value of one's own 
capacity as a rational, autonomous being to create one's own life and 
values. much as the author of a story creates the characters. the story-
line. and the values expressed in the story he writes. 
This "author perspective." Hill claims. comes closest to describm, 
the modified Kantian ideal. It would permit some suicides, for in-
stance, of persons facing the onset of permanent vegetative states, of 
persons in irremediable pain. and of persons who act from strong mn 
convictions. but it would not commend suicides which are out of liM 
with this ideal. Since many of the suicides we most frequently confroDt 
do fall short of this ideal, the Kantian moral theory Hill is exploriDI 
provides an objection to t hem. 
egan, in turn. addresses both the utilitarian and the "mod-
R ern Kantian" views of suicide, distinguishing (as Hill doeII the "modern Kantians" from Kant. Both utilitarianismaad modern Kantianism, according to Regan, fail to providl 
moral condemnation of suicide where they should. They fail becaUlt 
they are unable to specify what a person ought to do with his own liJ& 
Since they cannot say what a person ought to do with his life, they c8' 
not say (at least in those self· respecting cases where consequences II 
others are ruled out) why a person ought not simply end his life. _ 
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Regan insists, in most ordinary cases a person ought not to end his life; 
that is intuitively clear. These are the cases, typically, in which people 
do not contemplate or attempt suicide: these are the " normal" cases, 
into which most (nonsuicidal) persons fit. Generally speaking, suicide 
in these cases would be morally wrong, but neither utilitarianism nor 
modern Kantianism is able to show why this is so. 
However, to say that in most ordinary cases a person ought not com-
mit suicide is not to say that no one should, or that the people who do 
contemplate, attempt, or actually commit suicide should not. Indeed, 
Regan holds, there are a number of kinds of cases in which suicide is 
permissible or even commendable, including the soldier who kills him· 
eelf to protect the secret military information torturers would other-
wise extract from him and the person in the final stages of an 
agonizing terminal illness. Both utilitarianism and modern Kant-
ianism are able to show what makes these suicides morally acceptable. 
But they are unable to show why ordinary people in ordinary 
situations ought not kill themselves-that is, why even those who are 
DOt considering suicide, or are not at risk for suicide, nevertheless 
ought not do so. 
That most ordinary persons who ought not commit suicide are not 
actually contemplating it does not alter the philosophical problem 
Regan finds with the two major et.hical theories. Most of us do not con-
template, say, murder or robbery: but both utilitarianism and modern 
Kantianism can easily provide reasons why in most ordinary cases we 
ought not do so. Yet they cannot show why suicide would be wrong in 
the vast majority of cases. Hence, both theories fail at a crucial point. 
To remedy this deficiency, Regan supplies an account of his own, 
drawing on the ethical intuitionism of G. E. Moore. Moore's theory, 
Uke utilitarianism, measures the moral value of actions in terms of the 
consequences to which they lead, but it posits two major sorts of good: 
pleasurable knowledge of certain natural and cultural objects, and 
pleasurable enjoyment of certain kinds of relationships with other 
people. Regan 's Moorean view insists that one ought to attempt to at-
tain these goods; doing these things is what one ought to be doing with 
Obe's life. Hence, one ought not commit suicide; there is something one 
lbouJd be doing instead. 
Despite the fact that this view will provide a reason for preventing 
IUic.ide in most ordinary cases (although suicide is not likely to be at-
tempted in these cases), it does invite a rather different attitude 
toward the person who actually does attempt or complete suicide. The 
Ippropriate moral attitude is not so much condemnation as pity. This 
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person has not managed to create enough of the major sorts of good, 
both in themselves pleasures, in his life. Regan notes the odd irony of 
this point. Had such a person acted in a morally correct way and " done 
the right thing" by remaining alive, not only would this life have been 
of greater intrinsic value, but it would have had more good in it, and 
thus more pleasure, for him as well. 
artorius examines moral theory as it becomes the basis for S public poli.cy, with particular reference to suicide preveD-tion. Libertarianism, the ethical stance he adopts, is • variety of modern Kantianism, and is now the focus of c0n-
siderable political as well as philosophical interest. Much recent libef.. 
tarian writing has been concerned with the appropriate role of the 
state. Sartorius is interested here not so much in official governmental 
activities, but in t hose of quasi·official institutions and aggregates ~ 
persons, such as hospitals, medical boards, policy planners, aoll 
suicide-prevention centers. 
In Sartorius' view, the liberty of the individual is of paramount i.J:o. 
portance. This is because what gives meaning and value to life is till: 
freedom to choose one's own life plan and to live as one sees fit. Thill 
liberty should be limited only when a person would otherwise constl"iclr: 
the liberty of others, or do them harm. If a person chooses to Ii 
badly. that is his right. providing he does not harm others. We are J. 
entitled to coerce him into self-improvement. Furthermore, if a per_ 
freely chooses not to live at all, this too is his right. Except for uaJ 
warranted harms to others, we have no right to force him to stay ali 
Sartorius examines this view by addressing the statistical prohl 
no doubt familiar to many readers of this volume. that aggre . 
policies in suicide prevention raise. Given the imperfect reliability 
suicide prediction measures, a policy designed to prevent suicide by 
voluntary hospitalization and treatment will, in practice, mean 
some persons wno would not in fact have committed suicide are 
jected to hospitalization and treatment in order to prevent t 
suicides which would otherwise actually occur. Sartorius draws 
analogy to the criminal law: suicide prevention, as we practice it, is 
a legal system which incarcerates all those who might commit c . 
in order to be sure to catch those who will actually do so. But this 
fundamentally unjust. and, Sartorius claims. so is suicide preven 
which limits a person's liberty when it has less than adequate evid 
that he would otherwise kill himself. A scientific community and 
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)Dent network which identifies persons "at risk" of suicide and con-
fines or treats them against their will on this basis is operating on 
ebaky moral ground, if the base rates are low and the false positive 
rates high. This is not to claim that we ought to scrap suicide-
prevention efforts altogether or that we ought never step in to prevent 
aself·inflicted death. Rather, the claim is that we ought to display the 
lIDle concern for human liberty in civil commitments as we do in the 
criminal law. If we insist, as we do, on very high standards of 
reliability for the limitation of liberty under the criminal law, we ought 
&0 insist on similarly high standards for civil commitment too. The 
higher the standard. of course, the lower the valid positive rate, and 
• more frequently actual criminals and irrational suicides will go 
free. So there must be a tradeoff, Sartorius recognizes. He offers no 
ralculus for determining how it should be made in either case, but he 
does argue that compensation is owed to those who have thereby been 
1DI.justly deprived of their freedom. 
Sartorius' libertarian view has one further consequence for suicide 
prevention. Under this view, no one is entitled to be prevented from 
saicide. If a person attempts suicide, no one else, and no group. is 
obligated to try to save him. If they do so. it is a matter of generosity. 
Dove and beyond the call of duty. Consequently, the prospective 
IlUicide ought not count on any attempt to rescue him. No one can com· 
plain that inadequate rescue efforts, or no rescue efforts at all, were 
made on a suiciding individual's behalf. 
T
his collection is not just a "philosophers' volume." After all, 
the moral theories employed in our culture are what give 
form to our views about what is right and what is wrong to 
do: they are reflected in custom, public policy, and law. It is 
euy to assume that all of these weigh against suicide in any and every 
form. but a more careful philosophic analysis suggests that this is not 
110. Of course, such results do not show that we ought to alter our views 
about public and clinical policy without further consideration, and the 
lIIetion of sociologist Ronald Maris and psychiatrist Jerome Motto 
Ire presented here to voice the kind of critiques that may arise in 
f'IIponse to the philosopher's abstract, theoretical view. Nevertheless, 
IOda..l scientists. psychiatrists, and philosophers all acknowledge that 
~t rethinking of our ethical commitments concerning suicide is in 
order, and we may hope that discussion among them will mark the 
ItDesi.s of a more informed and sensitive view. 
